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The paper considers production in a simple two period general equilibrium model with
incomplete markets. It shows, by application of convex sets analysis, the separation of
economic activities of the agents. The paper improves on Stiefenhofer (2010) by taking a
geometric approach to the study of the decentralization theorem. This theorem separates the
economic activities of the agents, hence generalizes the objective function of the rm of the
Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets, where rms are prot maximizers.
1 Introduction
Dr eze [2], and Grossman and Hart [5] introduce objective functions of rms which are not
independent of the utilities of their owners into the analysis of general equilibrium with
incomplete markets. Thus, in their economic scenarios, rms are utility maximizers, and
therefore, the economic activities of the agents centralized. This result is a consequence
of the exogenous asset structure considered in their models.
Stiefenhofer [7] adds more structure to the economic model by endogenizing the rms'
production sets. The novelty of this model is the generalization of the objective function
of the rm of the Arrow-Debreu model to incomplete markets. This objective function is
independent of the utility of the owners of the rm, hence, the economic decisions of the
agents separated. This objective function has a nice property, it rehabilitates the prots
maximization criterion of the Arrow-Debreu model [1].
This paper considers a geometric approach to the the separation theorem of economic
activities of the agents in incomplete markets introduced in [7]. We apply convex sets
analysis [3] to show the decentralization of the objective function of the rm of the model
introduced in Stiefenhofer [6]. The asset structure of the leading case model is suciently
rich to prove the result in its simplest form.
Part 2 of the paper introduces the model. Part three states the main result, and part
four is a conclusion.
2 The Model
This paper considers a variation of the model of the rm introduced in [6] and [7] for the
case that nancial activities are explicitly modeled. This requires the introduction of an
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1extensive form model of the rm. We consider a simple model with sucient structure to
highlight the main properties of interest. Let the budget constraints of the single agent
as a consumer be
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + R( y;s)z:
A consumption bundle x = (x(0);x(s)) is a collection of vectors dened on the strictly
positive orthant R
l(S+1)
++ with associated strictly positive price system p = (p(0);p(s)) in
R
l(S+1)
++ . A nancial quantity z (number of stocks) is a strictly positive real number R++
with associated price system q in R++. We denote the initial resources of this economy
! = (!(0);!(1)) in R2l
++. Note that there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy,
instead we consider rm specic risk. An uncertain state of nature is an element denoted
s in the exhaustive set of mutually exclusive elements S. R( y;s)z denotes the return of
investment into the rm. The consumer invests into the rm in order to transfer wealth
across time and between uncertain states of nature.
In a one agent model the agent also performs the role of the producer, and therefore,
adds following variables to his constraints
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz + qb   p(0)   k(0)
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + R( y;s)z + p(s)  y(s) ;
where  k(0) denotes the capital purchased. Let aside the modeling of nancing production
for a while, therefore, let  = z +^ b; where ^ b is a feasible nancial policy of the rm such
that ^ b ) Y j^ b : Here, take production set Y j^ b as given. This production set is available to





++  R  R
lS :
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   q   p(0)   k(0)




The agent 's control problem is to choose (x;;y) such that utility of consumption of
goods is maximized. By reduced form, we mean a model where nancial policies are not
explicitly modeled and decisions of the agents not fully separated. We formally introduce
the reduced form model below.
Denition 1 A reduced form equilibrium ( p;  q) with associated equilibrium allocations  
 x;  ;  y





 x;  ;  y

argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bg
(ii)   = 0
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;:::;Sg.
(2)
Proposition 1 Let Y j  and  be two nonempty convex sets. Then ( y;  ) is a geometric
solution of the reduced form problem (Def.1)
 




u(y + ) : y 2 Y j  ;  2 
o
(3)
if and only if
ru( y +  ) 2 NY j ( y) \ N( ): (4)
2Proof 1 (proposition 1) Let v : RS+1R+ ! R be dened by v(y;) = u(y+). Then
the two variable control problem above is equivalent to
 




v(y;) : (y;) 2 Y j   
o
(5)
By application of the separation theorem for convex sets ( y;  ) is a solution of this control
problem if and only if  
ryv( y;  );r( y;  )

2 NY j ( y;  ) (6)
where ry denotes the gradient of v with respect to y, and r denotes the gradient of v
with respect to : From the denition of a normal cone (appendix) it follows that
NY j ( y;  ) = NY j ( y)  N( ) (7)
and from the denition of the function v that
ryv( y;  ) = rv( y;  ) = ru( y +  ) (8)
so that
 
ryv( y;  );r( y;  )

2 NY j ( y;  ) reduces to ru( y +  ) 2 NY j ( y) \ N( ):
We now introduce the extensive form model, where decisions are fully decentralized
and nancial policies explicitly modeled. Consider the consumer's constraints
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + ( z)R( y;s);
where qz is the value the consumer is willing to invest into the rm. ( z)R( y) denotes
the proportional share of total dividend payo the consumer receives in the next period.





++  R  R
lS :
p(0)  x(0) = p(0)  !(0)   qz
p(s)  x(s) = p(s)  !(1) + ( z)R( y;s)

: (9)
As a producer, the agent issues stocks b satisfying qb = qz, buys capital k(0) such that
income from selling stocks is equal to his expenditure on capital consumption, therefore,
qb = p(0)  k(0). At t = 0, the producer's long run problem is to
  k(0); b)

argmaxf qb :  q z =  qb =  p(0)  k(0)g; (10)
where the level of capital, k(0), implies total production capacity available to the rm, a
correspondence j^ b : This correspondence in turn determines the production set available
to the rm, denoted Y j^ b : Given this production set, and the set of states of nature, the
producer's t = 1 short run problem is to
( y(s))argmaxf p(s)  y(s) : y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s);8s 2 Sg: (11)
Inputs of production are nanced with sells from outputs. The level of revenue a
rm can generate in each state s 2 f1;:::;Sg depends on the available production set
determined in the certain state of the world. We formally introduce the equilibrium
denition of this model.
3Denition 2 ( p;  q) is a decentralized objective function extensive form equilibrium with




) for generic initial resources ! 2 
, if for
any feasible ^ b 6  z following conditions are satised:
(i) ( x;  z)argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bzg
(ii) argmax




s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)
y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s) s 2 S

(iii)  z +^ b = 0 ( z) = 1
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;::;Sg.
(12)
Proposition 2  xj z is a solution of
maxfu(x;z) : x 2 Bg (13)
if and only if,  xj z 2 B; and
@u( xj z) \ NB( xj z) 6= f0g (14)
is satised.
Proof 2 (proposition 2) (i)  xj z is a solution of utility max (2) if and only if  xj z 2 B
and
intU  xj z \ B = ?:




P = fx 2 R
n : P  x  P  x
0;8x 2 B;8x
0 2 intU xg






n : P  xj z  P  x
0;8x
0 2 intU  xj z
	
:





8x0 2 U  xj z : P   x  P  x0;8x0 2 U  xj z
	
, P 2 @u( xj z)
H
 
P = f8x 2 B : P  x  P  xj z ;g , P 2 NB( xj z)
hence, there exists p such that @u( xj z) \ NB( xj z) 6= f0g is satised.
(ii) Suppose that  xj z 2 B; and there exists P 2 @u( xj z) \ NB( xj z); P 6= 0: If  xj z is
not a solution of the utility maximization problem (2) then there exists x'2 intU  xj z \ B:
Since P 2 @u( xj z), we have
P  x0 > P  xj z
But since P 2 NB( xj z) and x0 2 B; it follows that P  x0  P  xj z which contradicts that
x0 is preferred to  xj z.
Proposition 3  yj z is a solution of
maxf(p;z) : y 2 Y j zg (15)
if and only if,  yj z 2 Y; and
@u( y) \ NY( y) 6= f0g (16)
is satised.
4Proof 3 (proposition 3) (i)  yj z is a solution of prot max in (3) if and only if  yj z 2 Y j z
and
int y \ Y j z = ?:






n : p  y  p  y
0;8y 2 Y;8y
0 2 int  yj z
	






n : p  yj z  p  y
0;8y
0 2 int  yj z
	
:




8y0 2 U y : p   y  p  y0;8y0 2   yj z
	
, p 2 @( yj z)
H 
p = f8y 2 Y : p  y  p  yj z ;g , p 2 NY j z( yj z)
hence, there exists p such that @u( yj z) \ NY j z( yj z) 6= f0g is satised.
(ii) Suppose that  yj z 2 Y j z ; and there exists p 2 @( yj z)\NY( yj z);p 6= 0: If  yj z is not
a solution of the prot maximization problem in (3), then there exists y0 2 int  yj z \ Y j z :
Since p 2 @( yj z), we have
p  y0 > p  yj z
But since p 2 NY j z( yj z) and y0 2 Y j z ; it follows that py0  p  yj z which contradicts that
y0 is preferred to  yj z.
3 Result
The result below separates the activities of the agent as a consumer and as a producer.
This follows from the separation of the objective function of the rm from the utility of
the owners of the rm. This in turn is a consequence of the endogenous asset structure
considered in this example.
Theorem 1 ( p;  q) is a geometrically reinterpreted extensive form equilibrium with as-




) for generic initial resources ! 2 
 with
decentralized objective function of the rm if for any feasible ^ b 6  z following conditions
are satised:
(i) ( x;  z)argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Bzg
(ii) argmax




s=1  p(s)  y(s) :
 q z   qb =  p(0)  k(0)
y(s) 2 Y j^ b (s) s 2 S

(iii)  z +^ b = 0 ( z) = 1
 x(0) = !(0) +  k(0)
 x(s) = !(1) +  y(s) for all s 2 f1;::;Sg.
(17)
Proof 4 (Theorem 1) By proposition (1) (( p;  q);( x;  ))) is a reduced form equilibrium
satisfying (i) of the extensive form model with decentralized activities if and only if the
geometric rst order conditions of proposition (2) hold. The prot maximization problem
(ii) of the extensive form model with decentralized activities ( y;^ b) is satised if and only
if the geometric rst order condition of proposition (3) holds. Since using proposition
(1) ( x;  z);( y;^ b) satises (i) of the (centralized) reduced form model if and only if both
geometric rst order conditions hold proposition (2), proposition (3), (( p;  q);(( x;  z);( y;b)))
is a geometric extensive form with decentralized activities equilibrium.
54 Conclusion
The separation result introduced in this paper generalizes the prots maximization crite-
rion of the Arrow-Debreu model to the case of incomplete markets. The novelty of this
result is the independency of the objective function of the rm from the utility of the
stock holders. This improves on the theory of the rm in incomplete markets where rms
are considered to be utility maximizers [4]. In this paper we take a geometric approach
to the separation theorem introduced in [7] by using convex analysis.
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